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LIFE AFTER DEATH:
THE AUTHORITY OF ESTATE FIDUCIARIES TO DISPOSE OF
DECEDENTS' REPRODUCTIVE MATTER
Ilene S. Cooper* & Robert M Harper"
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of artificial reproductive technology, it is
now possible for a decedent to conceive children after death. The po-
tential for posthumous conception, however, does not necessarily
give rise to absolute, unfettered discretion on the part of an estate fi-
duciary to make decisions concerning the disposition of a decedent's
reproductive material. As more fully explained below, such deci-
sions are subject to a quasi-property right, the exercise of which is
colored by a decedent's intentions. An estate fiduciary is duty-bound
to respect those intentions and should refrain from authorizing the use
of a decedent's reproductive matter, except when the decedent's in-
tent to reproduce posthumously is apparent.
II. ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Until recently, the prospect of posthumous conception more
closely resembled science fiction than contemporary medicine.
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Farrell Fritz, P.C. She concentrates her practice in the field of Trusts and Estates litigation.
Ms. Cooper is President of the Suffolk County Bar Association, an Adjunct Professor at
Touro Law Center, and a Fellow of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel.
Robert M. Harper (rharper@farrellfritz.com) is an associate at Farrell Fritz, P.C., concen-
trating in the field of Trusts and Estates litigation. He is a Special Professor of Law at Hof-
stra University and serves as Co-Chair of the Suffolk County Bar Association's Member
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1 Robert M. Harper, Dead Hand Problem: Why New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts
Law Should Be Amended to Treat Posthumously Conceived Children as Decedents' Issue
and Descendants, 21 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 267, 268-69, 270, 271 (2008) (discussing artifi-
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However, with the advent of artificial reproductive technology
("ART"), posthumous and other previously unfathomable forms of
conception are now scientific realities-the impact of which cannot
be denied.2 From 1985 to 2006, ART yielded approximately 500,000
births in the United States alone.3 Today, nearly one in every one
hundred American-born children is a product of ART.4
There are several methods of ART, through which posthum-
ous conception is possible, including in vitro fertilization, cryopre-
servation, artificial insemination, and embryo lavage and transfer,
among others.' In vitro fertilization ("IVF") is a common method,
accounting for a substantial percentage of ART procedures. 6  It in-
volves "fertilizing [a] human egg . . . outside of the mother's body,
and then . .. implanting it in the mother's uterus."
Cryopreservation is a subset of IVF.8  It entails freezing
sperm in nitrogen in order to preserve the material for subsequent
use.9 Cryopreservation is more advantageous than other ART me-
thods, since it allows for (1) the transfer of embryos on multiple oc-
casions; (2) the implant of embryos during the mother's natural men-
cial reproductive technology ("ART")).
2 See Monica Shah, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concerning Cryo-
preservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 548-49 (1996); see also
Bridget M. Fuselier, The Trouble with Putting All of Your Eggs in One Basket: Using a
Property Rights Model to Resolve Disputes over Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 14 TEx. J.
C.L. & C.R. 143, 146, 147-48 (2009) (discussing ART).
American Society for Reproductive Medicine ("ASRM"), Frequently Asked Questions
About Infertility, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited on March. 11, 2010)
("Since 1985, . . . through the end of 2006, almost 500,000 babies have been born in the
United States as a result of reported Assisted Reproductive Technology procedures ..... ).
4 ASRM, supra note 3 ("In 2002, approximately one in every hundred babies born in the
US was conceived using ART and that trend continues today.").
s See generally Shah, supra note 2, at 548-51.
6 Fuselier, supra note 2, at 146.
7 Shah, supra note 2, at 549; see also Erica Howard-Potter, Beyond Our Conception: A
Look at Children Born Posthumously Through Reproductive Technology and New York In-
testacy Law, 14 BUFF. WOMEN's L.J. 23, 27 (2006)
The steps involved in in vitro fertilization ("IVF") are as follows. First,
a woman takes "ovulation inducing drugs" in order to produce multiple
"oocytes" (eggs). Next, the eggs are harvested from the ovaries and
placed into a petri dish where they are combined with 50,000 pre-
selected "motile" sperm. Then, once (if) fertilization occurs, the result-
ing embryos are transferred ....
Id.
8 Howard-Potter, supra note 7, at 28.
9 Harper, supra note 1, at 270.
[Vol. 26650
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strual cycle, rather than a drug-induced cycle, which is disfavored for
implantation; and (3) "may reduce the occurrence of multiple preg-
nancies."'o
Gamete intrafallopian transfer ("GIFT") is another type of
IVF." In GIFT, a female's eggs are deposited into her fallopian
tubes with high quantities of sperm.12 GIFT is widely regarded as
more desirable than other ART methods because it mirrors fertiliza-
tion under natural circumstances, which typically occurs in the fallo-
pian tubes.' 3
Artificial insemination is also an ART method that is often
"used to combat male infertility." 4 It involves placing a male do-
nor's sperm into a female's cervical canal, uterus or vagina.' 5 Artifi-
cial insemination is favored in many circumstances, due to its rela-
tively low cost and the ease with which it can be performed.16
The final noteworthy ART method is embryo lavage and
transfer.' 7 In the embryo lavage and transfer method, the egg is ferti-
lized inside the donor's uterus, and then transferred to the donee's
uterus several days later.' 8 The risk inherent in this procedure is that
it may be impossible to remove the egg from the donor's uterus, the-
reby resulting in an otherwise unwanted pregnancy.19
As ART has developed, so too have several legal issues, not
the least of which is the extent to which the parties involved have
property rights in the subject genetic material.20 Courts, counsel,
commentators, and the parties themselves have, as more fully ex-
plained below, struggled to resolve this question.
10 Howard-Potter, supra note 7, at 28.
1 Harper, supra note 1, at 270; Howard-Potter, supra note 7, at 28.
12 Harper, supra note 1, at 270; Howard-Potter, supra note 7, at 28.
13 Howard-Potter, supra note 7, at 28 ("[lIt is assumed that the [fallopian] tube is a better
incubator than a Petri dish." (internal quotations omitted)).
14 Shah, supra note 2, at 548-49.
"s Id. at 549.
16 id.
17 Id. at 551.
1s Id
19 Shah, supra note 2, at 551.
20 See generally Hall v. Fertility Inst. of New Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App.
1994) (addressing the estate's interest in the decedent's frozen semen, which was deposited
with a sperm bank); see also Susan Kerr, Post-Mortem Sperm Procurement: Is it Legal?, 3
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 39, 59 (1999) (explaining that "there is no traditional property
right in a corpse").
2010] 651
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III. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE HUMAN BODY AND ITS PARTS
American courts have, historically, hesitated to acknowledge
the existence of property rights in the human body.2' More recently,
however, courts in the United States have carved out a limited, quasi-
property interest in the human body, its parts and reproductive mat-
ter.22
A. Quasi-Property Interest in the Human Body and
Its Parts
A quasi-property interest in the human body includes, among
other things, the right to dispose of a deceased relative's remains for
burial purposes and to donate certain body parts.23  It is widely re-
garded as a limited "right in the nature of a 'sacred trust' that a court
will uphold as a result of natural sentiment, affection, and reve-
rence."24 The qualified-property interest is one in the nature "of cus-
21 Charles M. Jordan, Jr. and Casey J. Price, First Moore, Then Hecht: Isn 't it Time We
Recognize a Property Interest in Tissues, Cells, and Gametes?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 151,172 (2002).
22 Id; see also Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property
Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEx L. REv. 209, 220 n.77 (1990) ("A quasi-property right is a
limited property right-the owner of the property has some but not all of the sticks in the
bundle of property rights."); Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Pt. Cemetery, 1872 WL 3575, at
*7 (R.I. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1872).
That there is no right or property in a dead body, using the word in its
ordinary sense, may well be admitted. Yet the burial of the dead is a
subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a much greater degree
than many matters of actual property. There is a duty imposed by the
universal feelings of mankind to be discharged by some one towards the
dead; a duty, and we may also say a right, to protect from violation; and
a duty on the part of others to abstain from violation; it may therefore be
considered as a sort of quasi property ....
Id.
23 Jordan, supra note 21, at 172; see also Painter v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 91 A. 158 (Md.
1914).
The courts hold that the surviving husband or wife or next of kin have a
quasi-property right in the body in the absence of testamentary disposi-
tion. The right is not a property right in the general meaning of property
right, but is extended for the purpose of determining who shall have the
custody of the body in preparing it for burial.
Id. at 160; Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 8(a) (2009) (authorizing gifts of body parts for cer-
tain purposes).
24 Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 352 A.2d 334, 341 (Md. 1976).
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tody, control, and disposition . . . [,] not material property[,]" and
does not carry with it the right to sell a corpse for profit.25
The quasi-property interest implicated in disposing of organs
and other body parts is slightly broader than the limited right to dis-
pose of a corpse. 26 Under the appropriate circumstances, an individ-
ual may donate her organs for transplant and, perhaps, even sell them
for other purposes.27 After the individual's death, the organs may be
donated by her surviving relatives. 28 Indeed, under the National Or-
gan Transplant Act and Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, the sale of
human organs is permissible when it is made for research, not trans-
plantation, purposes.29
However, the existence of a quasi-property right in remains is
not limited to the disposition of corpses and organs. In addition, as
discussed below, it also has been construed to include a right to dis-
pose of reproductive matter.
B. Property Rights in Human Reproductive Matter
The seminal cases concerning property rights in reproductive
matter are York v. Jones,30 Davis v. Davis,31 Hecht v. Superior
Court,32 and Hall v. Fertility Clinic of New Orleans.33 The import of
these cases is quite clear; namely, that the quasi-property right in the
human body and its parts extends to reproductive matter.34
25 Id; see also Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 879 (Pa. 1904) (explaining that the qua-
si-property right "is not absolute").
26 See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REv. 359, 375-
76 (2000) (discussing the rights to dispose of organs and other body parts).
27 id
28 Id. at 376.
29 See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 274 (2009); Unif. Anatomical Gift Act §§ 2, 10 (2009).
30 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
31 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
32 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
33 647 So. 2d 1348 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
34 See Shah, supra note 2, at 552-58 (discussing the treatment of reproductive matter as
"persons" or "property"); see also In re Dahl, 194 P.3d 834, 842 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (consi-
dering whether "it is just and proper to dispose of... embryos in the manner that the parties
chose at the time that they underwent [IVF]"); Kurchner v. St. Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 858
So. 2d 1220, 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that "[c]ases from other jurisdictions
hold that preserved sperm or eggs constitute personal property"); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d
1051, 1052, 1059 (Mass. 2000) (considering contract rights and procreation rights); Kass v.
Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179-82 (N.Y. 1998) (addressing the enforceability of an agreement
between progenitors of reproductive matter concerning the disposition of said material).
2010] 653
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In York v. Jones, the plaintiffs, a husband and wife, deposited
reproductive material with the defendant medical professionals and
center. After the defendants refused the plaintiffs' request that the
reproductive matter be transferred to another facility, the plaintiffs
commenced an action in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia, alleging breach of contract and detinue in
connection with said material.3 6 Although the defendants moved to
dismiss the action for failure to state a claim, the court denied that
motion, based upon, among other things, the assumption that the
plaintiffs had a property interest in their reproductive material.37
The Tennessee Supreme Court reached a similar, though
farther-reaching, conclusion in Davis v. Davis. In Davis, the plaintiff
sought a divorce from the defendant, his wife.38 In connection with
the divorce proceeding, the defendant requested control of the genetic
material the parties previously deposited with a reproductive center.39
While the defendant intended to use the material to conceive a child
after the divorce, the plaintiff objected, asserting that he should be
able to decide whether to father a child.40
Although the trial court initially ruled in the defendant's fa-
vor, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed and the defendant ap-
pealed to the State's court of last resort.4 1 However, by the time the
case reached the Tennessee Supreme Court, the parties' positions had
changed.42 The defendant had remarried and no longer intended to
use the material to impregnate herself.43 Ihstead, she wanted to do-
nate the reproductive matter to a childless couple, so that they could
conceive a child.44  The plaintiff "adamantly opposed" the defen-
dant's proposal and sought to have the reproductive material dis-
carded.4 5
3 York, 717 F. Supp. at 423, 424.
36 Id. at 422-23.
3 Id. at 427; see also Kurchner, 858 So. 2d at 1221 (opining that "the trial court properly
found that sperm outside of the body is property").
" Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592.
3 Id. at 589.
40 id.
41 Id. at 589-90.
42 Id. at 590.
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After first noting that the genetic material could not be consi-
dered "persons" under Tennessee law, the court opined that it was en-
titled to "special respect . . . to protect the welfare of potential
offspring ... who might be born after transfer." 46 This "special re-
spect" gave rise to what the court described as an "ownership" inter-
est on the part of the material's progenitors to make decisions con-
cerning its disposition.47 Accordingly, based upon the "ownership
interest," the plaintiff had a right to prevent the defendant from using
the genetic material to reproduce.48
Shortly after Davis resolved the extent to which a living party
has a quasi-property right in reproductive material, a California court
addressed whether that interest passes to a decedent's estate.4 9 In
Hecht v. Superior Court, the decedent deposited sperm at California
Cryobank, Inc. ("Cryobank"), instructing Cryobank to store or re-
lease the specimens to the executor of his estate, upon his death.50
Alternatively, the decedent authorized Cryobank to release the spe-
cimens to the petitioner, his live-in girlfriend.5 ' He also executed a
will, nominating the petitioner to serve as executor and bequeathing
his interests in the specimens to the petitioner should she wish to be-
come pregnant with them.52
The decedent committed suicide a month later.53 Following
the decedent's death and contests to the will, the court-appointed spe-
cial administrator of his estate petitioned to have the sperm samples
destroyed, among other things.54 The decedent's children from a
prior marriage supported the administrator's petition, to which the pe-
titioner objected. 5 The petitioner alternatively argued that she
should take the samples as a gift from the decedent or as a bequest
under his will.56 Accordingly, she argued, the estate's administrator
46 Id. at 595, 596 (internal quotations omitted).
47 Id. at 597.
48 Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
49 Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276, 283.
'0 Id. at 276.
52 Id.
12 Id. at 276-77.
13 Id. at 276, 277.
54 See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rtpr. 2d at 278-79.
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could not cause the samples to be destroyed."
Although the California Superior Court ordered that the sam-
ples be destroyed, the Court of Appeal reversed that decision.18 In
doing so, the court acknowledged that, "at the time of his death, [the]
decedent had an interest, in the nature of ownership, to the extent that
he had decision making authority as to the use of his sperm for repro-
duction."59 Such an interest was "sufficient to constitute 'property' "
under California law. 60 Thus, the samples constituted estate assets,
which the executor had a duty to preserve, pending completion of the
proceeding.6 1
In Hall v. Fertility Institute of New Orleans, the Louisiana
Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion, holding that the dece-
dent's sperm deposits belonged to his estate.62 There, the decedent
deposited sperm with a fertility clinic in order to ensure that he could
reproduce after undergoing treatment for cancer.63 He also executed
an Act of Donation form, purportedly gifting the sperm samples to
his girlfriend.6 4
After the decedent's death, the executor of his estate sought a
judgment declaring the sperm samples to be estate property, or alter-
natively, directing that the samples be destroyed. 65 The decedent's
girlfriend intervened, arguing that she owned the samples pursuant to
the Act of Donation.66 In opposition, the executor alleged that the
Act of Donation was invalid for lack of capacity and undue influence,
among other grounds.67
Upon considering the parties' contentions, the Civil District
Court and Court of Appeal concluded that the executor presented a
prima facie case entitling her to possession of the frozen material,
pending a hearing to determine the Act of Donation's validity.68 As
57 Id
58 Id. at 279-280, 283-84.
" Hecht, 20 Cal. Rtpr. 2d at 283.
60 Id. (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 62 (West 1993)).
61 Id.
62 Hall, 647 So. 2d at 1351.
61 Id. at 1349.
6 Id. at 1350.
65 Id at 1349.
66 Id,
67 See Hall, 647 So. 2d at 1350. Decedent's mother, Mary Alice Hall, was named testa-
mentary executor of his will. Id. at 1349.
68 See id. at 1351-52.
656 [Vol. 26
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the Court of Appeal explained, the "[executor was] the proper party
to claim and preserve succession assets." 69 Accordingly, the court
held that a preliminary injunction enjoining the sperm bank from re-
leasing or injecting the samples into the decedent's girlfriend was
warranted.
In addition to establishing that a quasi-property right in repro-
ductive material exists, the York, Davis, Hecht, and Hall cases are
significant because they have laid the foundation for civil claims aris-
ing from the wrongful destruction of such material. 7 1 For example, in
Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona, an Arizona court permitted the plain-
tiffs to sue the defendant reproductive medicine clinic for the negli-
gent loss or destruction of their pre-embryos.72 Likewise, in Frisina
v. Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode Island, the Superior Court of
Rhode Island denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment
concerning the plaintiffs' emotional harm due to the loss of irreplace-
able property claim, based upon the theory that the pre-embryos at is-
sue were "property."7 3  The courts likely would have dismissed the
claims asserted in Jeter and Frisina, absent prior judicial recognition
for the quasi-property right to reproductive material.
Though previously unthinkable, the development of a proper-
ty right in reproductive material has given rise to unanticipated legal
issues. From a trusts and estates perspective, the most critical of
those issues may be the extent to which an estate fiduciary has au-
thority to dispose of a decedent's reproductive matter as property of
the decedent's estate.
69 Id. at 1351.
70 See id. at 1352.
71 See Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona, 121 P.3d 1256, 1272-74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
prior cases in recognizing a claim for the negligent loss or destruction of pre-embryos); see
also Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579, at *6 (Ill. App. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005)
(acknowledging the existence of a "property right" in genetic materials, but dismissing the
conversion claim for failure to allege the right to "immediate, absolute, and unconditional
possession"); see also Frisina v. Women & Infants Hosp. of R.I., No. Civ-A. 95-4037, 2002
WL 1288784, at *10 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 30, 2002) (denying the defendants' motion for
summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' emotional harm due to the loss of irrepla-
ceable property claim).
72 See Jeter, 121 P.3d at 1271-73.
7 Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at *9.
2010] 657
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IV. FIDUCIARY AUTHORITY TO DISPOSE OF REPRODUCTIVE
MATTER
Despite the existence of the quasi-property rights discussed
above, an estate fiduciary does not have absolute discretion to make
decisions concerning the disposition of a decedent's reproductive
matter.74 To this extent, courts have held that the authority of an es-
tate fiduciary to make these decisions is circumscribed by the inten-
tions of the decedent."
Judicial opinions are consistent with the long-standing prin-
ciple that an estate fiduciary must act in accordance with the dece-
dent's wishes.7 6 Indeed, all other concerns are subordinated to the in-
tentions of the decedent. Generally, a fiduciary cannot substitute
his or her own judgments for the expressed intentions of the dece-
dent, no matter how reasonable or prudent the fiduciary's rationale.
The notion that a deceased donor's intent governs the disposi-
tion of reproductive matter dates back to 1984, when a French court
decided Parpalaix v. Centre d'Etude et de Conservation du Sperme
74 See E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and The Sperm: The Law
of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 229-33 (1985-1987) (discussing the
French case Parpalaix c. Centre d'Etude et de Conservation du Sperme); see also Am. Med.
Ass'n Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Code of Med. Ethics: Current Opinions E-2.04
(issued June 1993; updated Dec. 2004), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/ phy-
sician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion204.shtml (last visited on Mar.
11,2010).
7s See Estate of Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 311, 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining
that the sperm donor's intent should govern).
76 Cf Richard C. Bishop, Ethics in Estate Planning, I ETHICAL LAWYERING IN
MASSACHUSETTS §§ 16:1, 16:8 (2007) ("Because of its fiduciary position a[n] ... executor
has a duty to carry out the testator's intent and to act in the best interest of the estate and the
various beneficiaries."); see also In re Fabbri's Will, 140 N.E.2d 269, 271 (N.Y. 1957)
("The prime consideration here as in all construction proceedings is the intention of the testa-
tor as expressed in the will."); In re Godfrey's Will, 36 N.Y.S.2d 414, 415 (Sur. Ct. Rich-
mond County 1941) ("There is one cardinal principle of testamentary construction to which
all others are subordinate, namely, 'that the intention of the testator is to be sought in all his
words, and, when ascertained, is to prevail.' ") (citations omitted).
" In re Fabbri, 140 N.E.2d at 271 ("All rules of interpretation are subordinated to the re-
quirement that the actual purpose of the testator be sought and effectuated as far as is conso-
nant with principles of law and public policy.").
78 11 WARREN'S HEATON ON SURROGATE'S COURT PRACTICE § 187.01(4)(d) (7th ed.
2007); see also Ilene S. Cooper & Robert M. Harper, Exoneration Clauses-Not All They're
Cracked Up to Be, 81 N.Y. ST. B.J. 26, 26 (Oct. 2009) (explaining that a decedent's intent
must be respected).
10
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(the "CECOS").79 In Parpalaix, the decedent deposited his sperm
with the CECOS after learning that his treatment for testicular cancer
would render him infertile.so Although the decedent lived for another
two years, he did not leave any written directions as to the disposition
of the sperm upon his death.'
Following the decedent's death, his surviving wife requested
that the sperm deposit be released to her.82 When the CECOS re-
jected her request on the ground that "no law mandated the return[,]"
the decedent's wife and parents commenced litigation in the French
courts. In support of their claims, the wife and parents argued that
they were the decedent's natural heirs and, therefore, had an owner-
ship interest in the subject sample. 84 They also testified that the de-
cedent intended for the wife to "use the sperm to conceive after his
death."8 5
In deciding the case, the court opined that the decedent's in-
tent was its paramount concern.86 To establish that they were entitled
to the sperm sample, the decedent's wife and parents had to demon-
strate that the decedent intended for his widow to conceive with his
sperm and that his intent was "unequivocal."8 The court concluded
the wife and parents satisfied this burden with their testimony that the
decedent intended for the wife to have a child with his sperm.88 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the decedent's wife and parents were
entitled to the sperm sample.89
An American case often cited for the proposition that a dece-
dent's intent governs the disposition of reproductive matter (as estate
property) is Estate of Kievernagel. In Kievernagel, the decedent de-
posited a sperm sample with the Northern California Fertility Medi-
cal Center, Inc. ("NCFMC"). 90 He also signed an "IVF Back-Up
7 See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 74, at 229, 232 (discussing Parpalaix c. Centre
d'Etude et de Conservation du Sperme).
80 Id. at 229.
" Id. at 229-31.
82 Id. at 230.
83 id.
84 Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 74, at 230.
8 Id. at 230-31.
86 Id. at 232.
87 id.
88 id.
89 Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 74, at 233.
90 Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 312.
2010] 659
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Sperm Storage and Consent Agreement" (the "Agreement"), which
provided that the sample was the decedent's "sole and separate prop-
erty and [that] he retained all authority to control its disposition." 9'
The Agreement further stated that the sample should be discarded
upon the decedent's death.92
After the decedent died unexpectedly in July 2005, a Califor-
nia court appointed his wife, the petitioner, to act as administrator of
his estate.93 Thereafter, the wife petitioned the NCFMC to have the
decedent's sperm sample released to her. NCFMC refused to do so
without a court order. 94 That refusal prompted the wife to petition the
Superior Court of the State of California, County of Sacramento, for
an Order directing the release of the sperm sample to her.95 The de-
cedent's parents objected on the ground that the decedent did not
wish to father a child after death.96
Following an evidentiary hearing, the court made several fac-
tual findings.97 The court found that: (1) although the decedent and
petitioner loved each other a great deal, they did not agree on the is-
sue of whether to have children; 98 (2) the decedent deposited his
sperm with NCFMC because he knew that the petitioner wanted to
have children and believed she would divorce him if he failed to
make the deposit; 99 (3) the Agreement itself afforded the decedent an
opportunity to designate the petitioner as the ultimate beneficiary of
the deposit or to direct that the sample be discarded upon his death;' 00
and (4) the decedent chose to direct that the sample be discarded
upon his death.10'
The Probate Court denied the petition, finding that the dece-
dent's intent governed the distribution of his sperm sample as an as-





95 Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 311.
96 Id. at 312.
97 See id. at 312-13.
9 Id. at 313.
9 Id.
1oo Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 312, 313.
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Court of Appeal reasoned that "the intent of the deceased donor" di-
rected its decision.10 3  The Court of Appeal reasoned that "gametic
material, with its potential to produce life, is a unique type of proper-
ty and thus not governed by the general laws relating to gifts or per-
sonal property or transfer of personal property upon death."1 04
Accordingly, the decedent, "as the person who provided the
gametic material, had at his death an interest, in the nature of owner-
ship, to the extent he had decisionmaking authority as to the use of
the gametic material for reproduction." 0 The petitioner could not
circumvent the decedent's expressed intent in her capacity as admin-
istrator of his estate and, thus, the court was duty-bound to deny the
petition. 106
A New York court recently reached a similar conclusion in
Speranza v. Repro Lab Inc.'0 7 The issue in Speranza was whether the
plaintiffs, the administrators of a decedent's estate, could compel the
defendant, a tissue bank with which the decedent previously depo-
sited sperm, to release the samples to them in their fiduciary capaci-
ties. 0 8 The plaintiffs intended to use the samples to conceive a child,
notwithstanding the decedent's direction that the samples be de-
stroyed upon his death.'09
After the defendant denied their request, the plaintiffs com-
menced an action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York,
seeking a declaration that the samples belonged to the decedent's es-
tate.110 The Supreme Court dismissed the action, based upon New
York Department of Health regulations."' The regulations required
that a donor depositing sperm for use by anyone other than his regu-
lar sexual partner undergo extensive medical testing.1 2 Absent such
103 id.
104 Id. at 316 (citing Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283).
105 Kievernagel, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 316 (citing Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283) .
106 Id. at 317-18.
107 See generally 875 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452-54 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2009).
108 Id. at 450-51.
'0 Id. at 451.
110 Id.
". Id. at 451-52.
112 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 52-8.6(g) (2009) ("A client-depositor who
wishes to direct stored semen for use by a specific recipient, other than his current or active
regular sexual partner, shall first be fully evaluated and tested in accordance with [specific]
requirements."). Such requirements include providing a complete medical history and re-
leasing certain information regarding the donor and the donor's reproductive tissue to the
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screening, the donor's sperm sample could not be used by anyone
other than his regular sexual partner." 3
The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the Su-
preme Court's dismissal.1 4 The Appellate Division premised its de-
cision on the fact that the plaintiffs-as opposed to the decedent's
regular sexual partner-sought access to the samples and that the de-
cedent never underwent the requisite medical testing." 5 Those fac-
tors prevented the plaintiffs from establishing compliance with the
State's regulations and necessitated dismissal.' 16
In addition to seeking a declaration that the sperm samples be-
longed to the estate, the plaintiffs also sought to have the decedent's
agreement with the defendant reformed "to eliminate the applicability
of the directive that the specimens be destroyed, or to otherwise claim
a legal right to ownership of the specimens."ll 7 However, the court
declined to reform the agreement, as doing so would contravene the
decedent's expressed intent."' The court explained that the agree-
ment "represent[ed the decedent's] determined choice that the sperm
should be available to him so he could protect his ability to procreate
if he survived."' '9 "It [did] not protect any possibility that his genetic
or biological issue could be created after his death; indeed, the direc-
tive that his semen be destroyed in the event of his death precludes
such a possibility." 2 0 Accordingly, considering that the decedent's
intent was the foremost concern and that the agreement made clear
his intent not to procreate after death, the court held that there was no
evidence to "justify reforming the contract so as to permit [the plain-
tiffs] to fulfill their wish [to use the samples after the decedent's
death]."' 2 '
As Paralaix, Kievernagel, and Speranza demonstrate, a dece-
dent's intent to procreate after death is the paramount concern in any
dispute concerning the disposition of reproductive matter. Notwith-
recipient. See id. § 52-8.5.
11 Id. § 52-8.6(g).
114 Speranza, 875 N.Y.S.2d at 454.
11 Id. at 452, 453.
116 Id. at 453.
117 Id.
118 Id
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standing the existence of a quasi-property right in reproductive mat-
ter, estate fiduciaries have only been permitted to authorize the use of
such material when the decedent's intent to do so is clear. Estate fi-
duciaries are otherwise proscribed from substituting their own inten-
tions for those of the decedent, especially when there is no evidence
of the decedent's intent or the evidence conclusively shows that the
decedent did not intend to procreate posthumously.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the development of ART and the existence of a quasi-
property right concerning reproductive matter, an estate fiduciary
does not have absolute discretion to make decisions regarding the
disposition of a decedent's genetic material. Instead, the estate fidu-
ciary is duty-bound to act in accordance with the decedent's inten-
tion. Toward that end, an estate fiduciary must refrain from authoriz-
ing the use of the decedent's reproductive matter, except to the extent
that the decedent's intent to conceive posthumously is apparent.
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